Recently, Visiting Assistant Professor Run Li from the Department of Finance at the Southern University of Science and Technology (SUSTech) made progress in the study of the disclosure game in Microeconomic theory. The results were published in Economics Letters, entitled “Disclosure with unknown expertise.”

This paper builds a theoretical model to study a disclosure game in which a sender privately knows how much information she possesses and can disclose verifiable information to persuade a receiver to provide a higher reward.

In the model, the sender is privately informed of specific information based on her private expertise and can disclose any information that contains the truth. This study contributes to the disclosure game literature by providing a full characterization of the truth-leaning equilibrium of the disclosure model, in which the sender has a rich evidence space, and her expertise is unknown to the receiver.

The model predicts that the receiver may attribute any imprecise disclosure to the sender concealing unfavorable information. The main finding is that the most unfavorable possibility contained in information possessed by the sender will be fully revealed to the receiver in any truth-leaning equilibrium.

Run Li, Visiting Assistant Professor at SUSTech, is the single author of this paper.

Paper Link: https://authors.elsevier.com/a/1dk9wbZedt164

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